Aging Disgracefully

For instance, virtually alone among the navies of the great powers of the age, the British navy attempted wherever possible to "seize the weather gauge" in naval engagements. What this means in practice is that the British attempted to be upwind of their opponents. On the face of it, this involves two major disadvantages against one rather minor advantage. The first disadvantage is that either ship in the engagment would be pushed down to the wind, but the ship without the weather gauge be leaning away from the ship with the weather gauge, whereas the ship with the weather guage would be leaning toward the one without it. The ship without the weather gauge could thus open their lowest gun ports on the side of the ship that would be engaged in the action. The ship with the weather gauge would not be able to do so if winds were at all strong or seas at all heavy. Thus the ship without the weather gauge would be able to bring more guns to bear. The other disadvantage, of course, is that square rigged ships of the era had only a limited ability to sail into the wind. The ship without the weather gauge thus had more options in terms of disengaging if the fight went badly for them. Against these disadvantages, the ship with the weather gauge had a certain small advantage in terms of range (because it was firing with, rather than into the wind). However, this advantage could be quickly eroded if the winds (as was likely) caused the ship with the weather gauge to close on the one without it.*

Yet, despite this lack of physical advantage and seemingly strange tactical choices, the British navy of that era was essentially dominant. There are certainly hints regarding this success. For instance, various sources suggest that the British naval gunnery was superior in practice: they got off far more shots to each one the French fired. This hints at superior training, but why did this difference emerge?

Well, dear readers, in a fascinating paper that I have run across on the web, Douglas Allen offers a creative answer: the British navy got the balance of monitoring and incentives for captains and admirals right. As a result, they had the better trained crews (in terms of fighting skills), their ships were at sea more often (and thus, top to bottom, they were deeper in terms of the human capital of seamanship) and they were more likely to pursue the fight, and to do so to the finish. This is a really neat, approachable and fun read that examines the British navy (and other navies of the age) as a firm. The secret to Jack Aubrey's success, Allen would argue, is that he served in the firm that had done a better job overcoming the principal-agent problems created by the circumstances of naval warfare of the era.

* I should add that in fact the weather gauge did have one important advantage: without it it would be hard to seize the tactical initiative. Thus, the ship with the weather gauge had greater latitude in terms of deciding whether to engage an opponent without it. So, if you were really determined to fight, the weather gauge was desirable. But that all goes back to incentives, doesn't it? Why were the British so eager to fight, and so confident of victory, even when seemingly outmatched?